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We study a modified version of the coordination game presented in [J. van Huyck, J. Cook, R. Battalio, Selection
dynamics, asymptotic stability, and adaptive behavior, J. Polit. Econ. 102 (1994) 975–1005], where a representative
selection dynamics was proposed to explain experimental data. Assuming that the agents adjust their moves in the
direction of the best response, we derive a formal analysis of the stability of the equilibria. We show by simulation that the
interior equilibrium is robustly reached even when considerable heterogeneity is allowed among the agents. Our truly
multi-agent game is capable of approximating quite well both the ‘‘median’’ game convergence and the experimental data.
r 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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Whenever multiple equilibria arise in a game, the usefulness of the model is considerably hampered unless
some criterion is found to select among competing solutions. Learning—or broadly speaking adaptive
behavior—has often been advocated as a candidate mechanism for equilibrium selection in games. It has been
argued that a plausible criterion for equilibrium selection is that an equilibrium should be learnable by agents
employing some adaptive rule of behavior and be (locally) stable under the interaction dynamics generated by
such rule [1,2]. Tighter requirements for equilibrium selection are emerging as a large laboratory evidence on
learning in experimental games is being cumulated [3]. Such evidence suggests to introduce at least two
additional requirements for criteria of equilibrium selection.1. Beyond asymptotic stability, the convergence speed of the adaptive rules to equilibrium should be
compatible with empirical convergence times.e front matter r 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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learning behavior [3]
In this paper, we address these issues in the context of a coordination game belonging to a class of games
formerly explored by van Huyck et al. [4]. Problems of equilibrium selection arise naturally in coordination
games, since the multiplicity of equilibria is one of their defining features [5]. van Huyck et al. [4] have studied
both experimentally and analytically a simple coordination game called GðwÞ.
The game has two equilibria, a corner one and an interior one. Careful laboratory experiments conduced by
van Huyck et al. show that human subjects converge in fairly short time to the interior equilibrium for both
low and high values of w, while they never converge to the corner equilibrium. A simple and classical adaptive
rule, the Cournot myopic best-response dynamics, matches these results for values of w ranging in the (1,3]
interval, since it implies the stability of the interior equilibrium but the instability of the corner one. On the
other hand, for w43, both equilibria are unstable under myopic Cournot dynamics, in sharp contrast with the
experimental evidence. However, van Huyck et al. show that a rule of partial, inertial adaptation with
adjustment strength decaying over time (referred to as the L-map, from Lucas) predicts that even for values of
w in the (3, 4] interval, the corner equilibrium is unstable while the interior one is stable, thus reconciling
model and data. They conclude that the L-map provides an accurate selection criterion for the GðwÞ game.
While van Huyck et al.’s paper is a remarkable effort of combining theoretical insights and experimental
results, it suffers from the important limitation that their formal analysis is conduced hypothesizing a
‘‘representative agent’’ that, in fact, has to learn to coordinate with himself (the adaptive rule directly
‘‘decides’’ the median behavior in time). Well-known problems with the use of the representative agent are
especially acute when coordination problems are implied [6]. Chen et al. [7] try to overcome this limitation by
studying adaptation in the GðwÞ game through the genetic programming paradigm, which allows to simulate
multi-agent learning with a heterogeneity of individual behaviors. While their simulations show that genetic
programming selects the interior equilibrium for both high and low w values, convergence time is much slower
than the experimentally observed one, and there are persisting fluctuations around the equilibrium that are not
found in experimental data. More fundamentally, while genetic programming provides a powerful machine
learning algorithm, its psychological plausibility as a model of human learning is questionable.
We undertake a different way by considering a slight variant of the GðwÞ game, which allows a formal
analysis of learning dynamics without resorting to the representative agent fiction: we substitute the median
actionMðeÞ with the average action AðeÞ. Furthermore, we consider a learning rule which is a generalization of
both myopic best-response and the L-map, and is well grounded in the psychological literature.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we briefly review the coordination game of van Huyck et al.,
discuss the use of simple average instead of the median in the payoff function and provide some justification
for the use of our adaptive learning rule. Section 3 discusses the similarities of our learning rule with Cournot
myopic best-response and L-map adaptation. Moreover, we prove analytically some stability properties of the
modified game. In a nutshell, the interior equilibrium is robustly selected for a wide interval of adjustment
parameters. Numerical experiments and a comparison with original experimental data of van Huyck et al. are
presented in Section 4. Finally, some conclusive remarks are given in the last section.
2. The coordination game
We consider the coordination problem described in Ref. [4] in which n agents play a game GðwÞ whose
payoffs p is depending on the median action MðeÞ:
pðei; eiÞ ¼ c1  c2jei  wMðeÞð1MðeÞÞj,
where w 2 ð1; 4; c1; c240 are parameters, ei 2 ½0; 1 denotes the action of player i, ei ¼ ðe1; . . . ;
ei1; eiþ1; . . . ; enÞ. The payoff is clearly maximal when ei ¼ wMðeÞð1MðeÞÞ, i.e., when ith agent plays an
action that is a function of the median action of the others. It is straightforward to notice that there are two
symmetric Nash equilibria, namely those in which all players chose, respectively, actions 0 or 1 1=w that are
fixpoints of the best-response function bðMÞ ¼ wMð1MÞ. van Huyck et al. focus on the cases w ¼ 2:47222
and 3.86957. These two values will be named ‘‘low’’ and ‘‘high’’ in the sequel. While the corner equilibrium in
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choose 1 1=w turns out to be stable for w ¼ 2:47222 and unstable when w ¼ 3:86957. As any equilibrium can
be interpreted as a potential convention among agents, it is of interest to study selection dynamics that
converge to the equilibrium. van Huyck et al. consider a family of ‘‘representative’’ selection dynamics
described by the dynamical system
Mt ¼ bðMet Þ, ð1Þ
Met ¼ Met1 þ at1ðMt1 Met1Þ ð2Þ
for tX2, 0oatp1;Met is the expectation of the representative agent. It is shown that the myopic best-response
obtained setting at ¼ 1 for all t converges to the interior equilibrium only for low w. On the other hand, some
inertia (or adaptation) is beneficial to stabilize the interior equilibrium and the position at ¼ 1=t allows to get
convergence even when w is high. This is in perfect agreement with the experimental evidence provided in the
paper, where a number of experiments with real subjects are described. In all cases (for different values of w)
humans coordinate on the interior equilibrium. The authors then conclude that ‘‘The inertial selection
dynamics accurately predicts the behavior observed in our experiment. The myopic best-response does not’’.
In order to avoid the pitfalls of a ‘‘representative agent’’ model, that is implausible from both psychological
and economic standpoints, we undertake a different way by considering the game G0ðwÞ, a slight variant of
GðwÞ, which allows a formal analysis of learning dynamics without resorting to the representative agent fiction.
Thus, we consider the same game as in van Huyck, substituting the median action MðeÞ with the average
action AðeÞ for analytical convenience, setting:
p0ðei; eiÞ ¼ c1  c2jei  wAðeÞð1 AðeÞÞj.
The substitution we propose needs some further justification. On the one hand, the use of median values rather
than average ones in experimental coordination games can be explained by the fact that, given the small
number of participants to each experimental session, the median action is more robust to the presence of
outliers than the average action. However, in an analytic context such robustness considerations lose much of
their relevance. On the other hand, we show in Section 3 that in the average action game the adaptive rules
considered by van Huyck et al. preserve (even in a multi-agent setting) the same stability properties
demonstrated in the median action game.
In an authentic multi-agent framework, instead of a representative agent learning rule, we consider
individual learning rules and study their simultaneous dynamics. The simple individual rule for the ith agent
we analyze is
ei;tþ1 ¼ ð1 liÞei;t þ libðAtðeÞÞ, (3)
where bðAtðeÞÞ is the best response to the average action at time t and li40 is a parameter determining the
individual speed of learning. The rule turns out to be an instantiation of the more general ‘‘learning direction
theory’’ of Selten and Stocker [8] and Selten et al. [9]. In the learning direction theory (LDT), agents adjust in
the direction of the ex post best response to last period moves of other players. While the LDT pays the price
of having no parameters by providing only qualitative predictions, our rule introduces one parameter (the
speed of learning) but allows more precise predictions.1 A simple test conduced on van Huyck et al.
experimental data along the line described in Selten’s work shows a strong agreement with the LDT, providing
indirect support to our learning rule. Table 1 exhibits the results of a test of the null hypothesis of random
behavior against the alternative that the players follow some form of LDT. The null is rejected at conventional
significance level in seven instances out of eight, in favor of a behavior compatible with the LDT. As the
learning rule (3) always agrees with LDT, we interpret these findings as supporting2 the use of (3).1The rule also bears close resemblance with the Rescorla–Wagner model of learning, a model supported by a broad empirical evidence in
experimental psychology, see Refs. [10,11].
2This evidence is somehow indirect as other rules might be compatible with such results.
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Table 1
The table shows the p-values of Wilcoxon test run on the experimental data of van Huyck et al. [4] for w ¼ 3:86957
Wilcoxon test
Session p-value
1 0.039
2 0.033
3 0.021
4 0.021
5 0.021
6 0.039
7 0.021
8 0:072
The null hypothesis of random behavior of agents can be rejected in favor of LDT in seven cases out of eight at the confidence level of 5%
despite rather small sample sizes.
A. Fogale et al. / Physica A 380 (2007) 519–5275223. A formal analysis
This section presents a formal treatment of the average game along the following steps. We first study the
stability of the fixpoints of G0ðwÞ assuming that all agents have the same speed of learning l. We then use a
continuity argument to state that the same stability properties hold when agents are heterogeneous provided
that their l’s are not too different. It is of obvious interest to understand how much heterogeneity is allowed
before stability breaks down. The answer is deferred to the following section where we show with numerical
experiments that (3) is stable over a wide mixture of the l individual parameters.
The following theorem gives conditions for the stability of the equilibria of the G0ðwÞ game when all agents
have the same speed of learning.
Theorem 1. Assume li  l40 for all i. Then the average game admits, for any l, an unstable corner equilibrium
ð0; . . . ; 0Þ. The interior equilibrium
e ¼ 1 1
w
; 1 1
w
; . . . ; 1 1
w
 
is stable in the interval 0olo2=ðw 1Þ.
Proof. See Appendix.
The previous theorem shows that there is a wide set of individual l’s that allows convergence to the interior
equilibrium. In particular, considering the w values analyzed in van Huyck et al., if w ¼ 2:47222 then e is stable
for 0olo1:353; if w ¼ 3:86957 then e is stable for 0olo0:697. For low w, stability of the interior equilibrium
holds even under overreaction3 by agents (l41). When w ¼ 3:86957 the interior equilibrium is stable provided
that agents do not adjust too much their previous action in the direction of the observed best-reply. The
following result proves that the stability properties still hold in the presence of heterogeneous agents.
Lemma 1. Consider the average game G0ðwÞ and let l be such that 0olo2=ðw 1Þ. Then, if all agents have
learning speed l in a proper neighborhood of L ¼ ðl; l; . . . ; lÞ, the interior equilibrium of the game is stable.
Proof. The eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix at the equilibrium are continuous functions of the learning
rates L ¼ ðl1; l2; . . . ; lnÞ of the heterogeneous agents. Hence there exists L in a neighborhood of L such that
all the components of the interior equilibrium are in ½0; 1 and all the moduli of the eigenvalues of the Jacobian
matrix are bounded away from 1. It follows immediately that the equilibrium is stable. &3If l41, an agent whose action, say, is etobðAtðeÞÞ will play etþ14AtðeÞ in the following step, moving in the right direction even beyond
the best previous response. In this sense, it is overreacting.
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driving moderately heterogeneous agents to the interior equilibrium. Notice that this stability result holds even
when variable l’s are used by agents, provided that they eventually fall below an appropriate constant, 0.697
in our case. This is always the case when the l’s have, say, the form 1=t.
The result is novel in that there is no need for a representative agent and it sheds light on the individual
process used by the agents in their effort to coordinate. Further exploration of this result can be pursued by
resorting to numerical experiments, see for a similar example Ref. [12].
4. Applications and numerical experiments
This section builds on the previous results to show by computer experiments the degree of heterogeneity that
is allowed in the set of agents’ l’s. We also compare the multi-agent average and median games, showing
numerically that the dynamics of the former closely approximates the latter (that defies an analytical
treatment). All our experiments are conduced setting w ¼ 3:86957 in order to make them comparable with the
original laboratory results of van Huyck et al. We remind that, in order to achieve stability, the corresponding
l’s upper bound is 0:697.
We run two kinds of computer experiments. In the first case, we sample the l’s of the agents in the intervals
ð0; lÞ for 10 values of l 2 f0:11; 0:22; . . . ; 0:88; 0:99g [ f0:697g. We simulate a population of 5 agents as in
Ref. [4]. Clearly, values of l40:697 do not allow the application of Lemma 1 to ensure convergence. In the
second series of experiments, the l’s of k agents out of 5 are sampled in ð0; 0:697Þ while the remaining 5 k
have coefficients in ð0:697; 1Þ. This is intended to show the degree of ‘‘unstable’’ heterogeneity that is
compatible with convergence. In order to get meaningful results, we run 100 trials of 20 periods for each
experiment, displaying the mean result. To measure the distance from the equilibrium, we compute the
distance je  1
5
P
ieij for each t, where e ¼ 1 1=w. In Fig. 1 the distance from the equilibrium when all l’s
are sampled in ½0; l is displayed. The picture shows that, provided that lipl ¼ 0:66, convergence is quite fast,
despite the heterogeneity of agents. Notice that when l increases some cycles are appearing, in analogy with the
loss of stability of the logistic map.
The same conclusion can be inferred by looking at Fig. 2, depicting the distribution of the mean distance
from equilibrium for 10ptp20, in various cases. Most values are close to zero for values of lp0:66, showing
that less than 10 iterations suffice to reach equilibrium. The convergence is slower when l ¼ 0:697 and is never
reached for larger values.l
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Fig. 1. Dynamics of average distance from equilibrium for various values of l, when l is randomly sampled in ½0; l. The mean of 100 trials
is depicted.
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Fig. 2. Boxplots of distribution of average distances from the interior equilibrium for 10ptp20, and different values of l.
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Fig. 3. Boxplots of distribution of average distances from the interior equilibrium for 10ptp20, when k agents have l 2 ð0; 0:697Þ.
A. Fogale et al. / Physica A 380 (2007) 519–527524We might probe Lemma 1 sampling l in different stable and unstable intervals. Fig. 3 shows the distribution
of the average distances from equilibrium for 10ptp20 when k out of 5 agents have l sampled in ð0; 0:697Þ.
This is a situation where 5 k players overreact selecting l in ð0:697; 1Þ. The picture shows that three agents
with moderate l assure convergence to the equilibrium despite the presence of two ‘‘turbulent’’ agents.
Convergence is clearly not reached if no or only one agent have lp0:697, while an intermediate case in which
agents come close to equilibrium arises when k ¼ 2.
After this corroboration of the analytical results of the previous section, it is still to determine if our results
in the ‘‘mean’’ G0ðwÞ game hold also in the original ‘‘median’’ GðwÞ game described in Ref. [4]. Figs. 4 and 5 are
the counterparts of Figs. 1 and 3 when the median is used for computing payoffs, and rule (3) is adopted to
model agents’ behavior.
The convergence properties of the mean and median cases are quite similar for the vast majority of values of
l and k, thus justifying the choice to derive analytical results for the mean game to guess the behavior of the
median one. However, it should be noted that some border choice of parameters bears some differences, see
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Fig. 4. Average distance from the interior equilibrium for various values of l, when l is randomly sampled in ð0; lÞ and the median is used
for computing payoffs. The mean of 100 trials is depicted.
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Fig. 5. Boxplots of distribution of average distances from the interior equilibrium for 10ptp20, when k agents have l 2 ð0; 0:697Þ and the
median is used for computing payoffs.
A. Fogale et al. / Physica A 380 (2007) 519–527 525for example the behavior for l ¼ 0:77 in Figs. 1 and 4. Generally speaking, convergence, if any, in the median
game is more difficult to achieve than in the mean game.
We use van Huyck et al. laboratory data as a benchmark for a rough evaluation of the plausibility of
convergence speed of our learning rule. In their experiments, human subjects always converge in less than 15
periods. Very good agreement with such benchmark can be obtained on average (in the simulated median
game) when k ¼ 3; 4; 5 or sampling l in ½0; l with 0:22plp0:66.
5. Conclusion
Motivated by the work in Ref. [4], where a representative selection dynamics for a coordination ‘‘median’’
game was studied, we propose a modification of the payoff function that allows a formal analysis of the game
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a genuine multi-agent setting, even when a considerable amount of heterogeneity is injected in the players. We
assume, rather naturally, that each agent adjust his move in the direction of the best response, with different
speeds of learning li. Our selection dynamics generalizes Cournot myopic dynamics (if all li ¼ 1) and closely
resembles the Lucas’ dynamics. This behavior is consistent with the LDT by Selten and indeed statistical tests
show that the experimental data of van Huyck et al. are compatible in most cases with this theory, thus
making our assumption rather plausible at the micro level.
We show by simulation that the stability result we proved is robust to the introduction of heterogeneity and
even when some agents strongly overreact while playing. Finally, we show by simulation that the analytical
results of our ‘‘mean’’ game can be transferred to the original ‘‘median’’ game, for which analytical results
with multiple agents cannot be derived. Moreover, the convergence obtained in the micro-simulated game is
stable (in both versions) and occurs at about the same speed than the experimental data for a wide set of
parameters.Acknowledgements
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Proof of Theorem 1. We assume n agents play to the G0ðwÞ game, using the learning rule (3), with li ¼ l40
for all i. Consider the dynamical system f : ½0; 1n!½0; 1n defined as
ei;tþ1 ¼ f iðe1;t; . . . ; en;tÞ ¼ ð1 lÞei;t þ
lw
Pn
j¼1ej;t½1
Pn
k¼1ek;t=n
n
; 8i. (4)
All fixpoints are symmetric. In fact, assume by contradiction that there is an asymmetric equilibrium such that
ejaek; then we have
ej ¼ ð1 lÞej þ lwe^ð1 e^Þ; ek ¼ ð1 lÞek þ lwe^ð1 e^Þ,
where e^ ¼Piei=n. Subtracting the two previous equations, it is easy to see that ej  eka0 iff l ¼ 0, which is
ruled out by assumption.
The fixpoints of the dynamical system f can be determined solving the equation:
e ¼ w
P
e½1P e=n
n
,
which is derived from (4) after simplification and omission of indexes to simplify notation. Some trivial
algebra leads to the equation
e ¼ weð1 eÞ,
whose solutions are 0 and 1 1=w. Hence the two n-dimensional fixpoints of the average game are
ð0; 0; . . . ; 0Þ½corner; 1 1
w
; 1 1
w
; . . . ; 1 1
w
 
½interior.
The stability properties of the fixpoints depend on the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix J ¼ ½qf i=qej . With
the position
K ¼ lw
n
 2lw
P
ei
n2
,
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J ¼
1 lþ K K . . . K
K 1 lþ K . . . K
. . . . . . . . . . . .
K K . . . 1 lþ K
0
BBB@
1
CCCA.
The eigenvalues are the zeros of the equation jJ rIj ¼ 0. The determinant can be computed using
appropriate row and column reductions, yielding
ð1 lþ nK  rÞð1 l rÞn1 ¼ 0.
The first n 1 eigenvalues are 1 l while the last one is
r ¼ 1 lþ lw 2lw
P
ei
n
.
As in equilibrium either ei ¼ 0 or ei ¼ 1 1=w, for all i, it is immediate to check that the corner equilibrium is
unstable and the interior equilibrium is stable4 if 0olo2=ðw 1Þ. &References
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